Abstract. This paper extends Joux-Naccache-Thomé's e-th root algorithm to the static Diffie-Hellman problem (sdhp).
Introduction
In [11] , Joux, Naccache and Thomé showed that carefully interacting with an e-th root oracle improves one's ability to compute e √ t mod n for arbitrary t after the communication with the oracle.
In Joux et alii's game, the attacker can only query the oracle during a learning phase that takes place before t is known. As this learning phase ends, the attacker receives the target t and outputs it's e-th root. In other words, [11] establishes that the release of certain modular roots leaks information that eases the calculation of all future roots.
The attacks was implemented in F 2 1025 and also in F p , for a 516-bit p (details in the Appendix).
Conventions
Complexity: We express complexities using the following notations 8 : (1)) (log Q) ν (log log Q) 1−ν , Q (ν) = (log Q) ν (log log Q) 1−ν and D Q (ν, λ) = log q (L Q (ν, λ)) .
As L Q (ν, λ) includes an o(1), D Q (ν, λ) inherently stands for D Q (ν, λ + o(1)).
Following [9, 10] , we guarantee that the complexity of our algorithms is L( nfs: log q ∈ ω( Q ( Assumptions: We rely on the usual heuristic assumptions [3, 14, 13] :
-The probability that an integer q ∼ L Q (ν q , λ q + o (1) ) is a product of prime factors of magnitude at most L Q (ν p , λ p + o (1) ) is:
despite the fact that integers q might follow non-uniform distributions. -The probability that a polynomial q ∈ F q [X] of degree D Q (ν q , λ q ) 1 is a product of irreducible polynomials of degree at most D Q (ν p , λ p ) 1 is also:
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The Algorithm
In this section, we denote by ε the constant ε = 2 , such that the resultant of F 1 (x, y) = y − f 1 (x) and F 2 (x, y) = x − f 2 (y) with respect to variable y has an irreducible factor of degree n over F q .
Let f (x) denote this irreducible factor of Res y (
. Let α be a root of f (x) in F q n and let β = f 1 (α). Then, by construction, we have α = f 2 (β) too.
Learning Phase. We let F D be the set of all monic irreducible polynomials over F q of degree up to D and define
Descent. The descent phase consists in finding a multiplicative relation between the target z and the elements of F α ∪ F β . To do so, we use a special-q sieving subroutine (hereafter SqSS) as a basic building block. SqSS is called iteratively to steadily decrease the degree of intermediate polynomials.
The SqSS works as follows:
Let q be an irreducible polynomial in x (respectively y) of degree d q .
To ease SqSS's analysis we write d q as:
Note that the values ν q , λ q evolve simultaneously -as will be seen later in further detail.
SqSS's purpose is to write an element q(α) or q(β) as a product of elements of the form p(α) and p(β), where the p-polynomials are of degrees smaller than the degree of q.
The complexity analysis (cf. infra) shows that there exists, amongst these polynomials, polynomials H such that H x and H y both admit a factorization of the form:
By proceeding so, we can express an element q(α) or q(β) as a product of polynomials p of degrees at most D Q (ν p , λ p ) evaluated at α or β.
Descending Using SqSS. Define the sequences:
We note that, indeed, ν k = ϑ k and that the limit at infinity of the sequence λ k is equal to
∼ = 1.234. As our procedures perform a finite number of steps, these ad infinitum convergence targets are only approached. However, the limit at infinity guarantees that during the phase of the descent where ν decreases, λ remains bounded (smaller than the above limit). After that point ν remains constant and λ quickly tends to ε.
The descent starts with one polynomial q(x) of maximal degree D Q (ν 0 , λ 0 ) with z = q(α). After a first invocation of SqSS we get polynomials p in x and y of degree at most D Q (ν 1 , λ 1 ) where ν 1 = 
we eventually reach polynomials of degree at most D Q (ϑ n+1 , λ N ).
Consider the sequence
We iterate SqSS O(log n) additional times; thereby generating polynomials of degree D Q (ϑ n+1 , λ k ). Eventually, we reach polynomials of degree at most D, i.e. D Q (ϑ n+1 , ε).
It remains to combine these relations to write z as a fraction of products of elements of the form p(α) or p(β) with the degrees of p bounded by D. Finally, we use the oracle's answer
Complexity
We analyze the complexity of each step:
The sum of the degrees of H x and H y is:
As, in addition, q divides one of these two polynomials, our smoothness probability is identical to that of d p -smooth polynomials of degree 2 (
And the probability that polynomials of this degree are D Q (
SqSS For ν q ϑ n+1 : The sum of the degrees of H x and H y is:
Again, the odds that polynomials of this degree are
In both cases, after enumerating L Q ( 3 n 2 log 2 q n). As the whole process involves O(log n) SqSS calls, the total number of medium-size polynomials p to be considered is:
Running SqSS on each of these polynomials, costs L Q ( (1)), which is far larger than exp(O(log 2 n)); we thus conclude that the descent's complexity is L Q (
Since log
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Total Complexity: The attack's total complexity is hence L Q (
9 + o(1)), in time, space and oracle accesses.
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Due to lack of space, we only sketch the two nfs algorithms covering large and medium basefield cardinality-values q. As our algorithms preserve, mutatis mutandis, most ffs features, we will mainly focus on the specificities proper to these two cases. We also refer the reader to [11] , whose arbitrary e-th roots procedure has to be slightly modified to fit the case under consideration.
Algebraic Side: In the ffs case, thanks to the existence of an ad-hoc construction, both sides are rational, i.e. on both side we only encounter polynomials. With the nfs matters get more complicated. Indeed, all known polynomial constructions for nfs procedures involve at least one non-trivial number field.
For example over F p the base-m construction yields two polynomials f 1 (x) = x − m and f 2 (x), such that p | f 2 (m). Since f 1 is a linear polynomial, it generates a trivial number field: the corresponding side is rational and can be addressed using integers. However, f 2 defines a number field Q(α) with non trivial unit and class groups.
Consequently, to deal with f 2 's side 9 , we need to work with factorizations into ideals: the algebraic factor base consists of ideals of small norm. This change truly complicates the approach. As the ideals in the factor base are usually non-principal, we do not know how to construct an oracle query corresponding to a given ideal.
Instead, we need to find smooth a − bα values which factor into small ideals and "translate" them to integers a − bm for the oracle.
Linear Algebra: To relate these factorizations back to multiplicative relations in F Q we must resort to linear algebra, which can be done in two ways:
-Repeating the descent of [11] , it is possible (using the oracle's answers) to relate the challenge z ∈ F Q to some a − bm ∈ Z such that a − bα factors into small ideals. By solving a linear system over Z/ (Q − 1)Z , this exact factorization can be mapped to a multiplicative combination of oracle answers.
Note that to transform the equality of ideal factorizations into an equality that makes sense in F Q , one must include additive characters in Z/ (Q − 1)Z ,à la Schirokauer [15] . Since this methodology performs a linear algebra step that depends on the challenge, it therefore yields an algorithm where the linear algebra step has to be redone for each challenge.
-There is also a second method -very specific to our setting. It is possible to use linear algebra to compute virtual sdh values that correspond to each ideal 10 . From a theoretical standpoint, this can be justified as in [8, 16] . Note that this second method also requires the inclusion of additive charactersà la Schirokauer.
Note that in some cases (nfs-hd), there are two algebraic sides to consider.
We start from a large system of equations, where each equation expresses a value in F Q -the equation's generator -as a product of ideals in the number field. Moreover, we are also given the power of this value returned by the oracle. Our goal is to associate to each ideal I a number P I such that in each equation, the substitution of I by P I will yield a product whose value matches the oracle's answer for this equation.
If we can achieve this goal, P I can be looked upon as an oracle output for I, and we are back in a ffs-like scenario. However, this is not completely straightforward:
A first (costly) option would be to use linear algebra over the integers and express each ideal as a product of generators (possibly with rational exponents) but one may note that the vector of generators and the vector 11 of ideals are related by a matrix multiplication in the exponent. More precisely, if ideals are indexed from 1 to B, and denoting by G i the i-th
where denotes matrix multiplication in the exponent, i.e. where for all i:
Moreover this matrix multiplication in the exponent is defined modulo Q − 1, the cardinality of F * Q . Having observed that, we can use Wiedemann's algorithm [17] 
10 We assume here that the class number of Q(α) is co-prime with the relevant prime factors of Q − 1. This assumption is clearly expected to hold. 11 In this vector, there are also a few additional components corresponding to the additive characters.
where O(G i ) denotes the oracle's output for the generator G i .
This linear algebra step based on [17] has essentially the same complexity as usual, with the small caveat that additions are replaced by multiplications and multiplications by constants are replaced by exponentiations.
Complexity
The L Q ( 
Cryptanalytic Applications
This section follows very closely Brown and Gallant's [1] . Variable were renamed to ease the identification of on parameters playing specific roles in our algorithms (e.g. secret d, oracle queries x i etc).
It is clear that any cryptographic protocol where the secret-owner plays the role of a sdhp-oracle will succumb to the new attacks. The technique can apply to primitives as diverse as public-key encryption, digital signature and key retrieval.
Textbook El-Gamal Encryption
As observed in [1] , textbook El-Gamal encryption makes an sdhp oracle available. El-Gamal encryption of message m to a receiver with public-key
In a chosen ciphertext attack against an encryption scheme, an adversary A can select any ciphertext and obtain its decryption. Textbook El-Gamal is already known to be vulnerable to chosen ciphertext attacks. The known attacks mainly allow information to be learned about previously encrypted messages but do not leak anything about d. In the scenario described here, an attacker use the receiver as an oracle to learn how to decrypt future traffic sub-exponentially, but still significantly faster than all previously known sdhp-solving algorithms.
Ford-Kaliski Key Retrieval
In Ford-Kaliski's key retrieval protocol [5] , a client picks a random exponent b and computes x = g b .
x is sent to the server who, replies with s = x d . The client computes t = b √ s and retrieves
The protocol's purpose is to transform a low-entropy secret password g into a hardened password g d involving a longer secret known only to the server. This prevents dictionary attacks on the client's password. Therefore, the server plays exactly the role of the sdhp oracle considered in this paper.
Variants of this protocol are currently under discussion in two standardization groups [6, 7] .
Chaum-Van Antwerpen's Undeniable Signatures
Another protocol in which an sdhp oracle is available is Chaum and van Antwerpen's undeniable signature scheme [2] . The protocol uses a prime modulus p = 2q + 1 such that q is prime. As the factors of x 18π (x) mod f (x) have degrees 1, 4, 6, 11, 32, 73, 217, 339 and 341, listing here the entire descent tress would require too much space. Instead, we opt to zoom on the path of length 12 starting with a special-q equal to the factor of degree 341 and following recursively, at each node, the highest degree factor. This yields table 1, where the a i,j stand for the following hexadecimal values:
The special-q degree in x or y is underlined in the corresponding column and smoothness probabilities are expressed as 2 −ψ . We wrote our software chain in c, relying upon the computer algebra systems pari-gp and magma for a handful of specific tasks. The whole computation was run on single Intel Core-2 at 3.6 GHz, with a 16 Gb memory. Each SqSS call claimed roughly five minutes and the entire attack took less than a week.
A.2 Number Field Side Experiments
We also experimented the nfs variant in the finite field F p , where p is the 516-bit prime 10 155 π + 88896 (p is the smallest prime above 10 155 π such that p−1 2 is also prime). We computed the secret d-th power of an element in F Q after a learning phase of 140 million sdhp-oracle queries.
We selected the following polynomials for defining respectively the rational and algebraic sides:
Sieving was done using a modified version of J. Franke and T. Kleinjung's lattice sieving code as included in the ggnfs software suite. We selected a factor base comprising the 43,321 prime ideals of norm smaller than 2 19 and obtained generators factoring over this set of ideals after four sieving minutes using 128 Intel Core-2 cpu cores clocked at 1.6 GHz. We then used the factor base extension step detailed in [11] and sieved again for 24 minutes, using the same set of processors. This allowed us to relate the vast majority of ideals of norm smaller than 2 32 to smaller-norm ideals using 140 million oracle queries.
We postponed linear algebra computations after the descent (cf. to the two options explained in section 4).
The descent was coded in magma, where the SqSS was performed by a modified version of J. Franke and T. Kleinjung's lattice sieving code, including several modifications pertaining to the descent step (most notably co-factorization of norms using the gmp-ecm program).
We started from the challenge value τ = 2 log 2 N − log 3 N . The first decomposition step consisted in finding a related finite field element (e.g. 2 k τ for some k, assuming 2 was an oracle query) which factored suitably over the integers.
We searched during a few minutes for a suitable integer k. The corresponding factorization involved seven primes unlinked to the factor base, the largest of which having 27 digits. Afterwards, using 164 intermediate descent steps (139 on the algebraic side and 25 on the rational side), we managed to link our initial challenge to the factor base.
The final link between our challenge and the oracle queries was obtained by solving a linear system involving the matrix formed by the first set of relations obtained by sieving; the right hand side formed by the ideal factorization stemming from the descent. After adding character maps, we solved this 43,378 rows and columns system in eight hours on four Intel Core-2 cpu cores clocked at 2.4 GHz.
B Complexity Analysis -Regular nfs
Here, we work in F Q , with Q = p n and p > L Q ( 
B.1 Sieving And Linear Algebra
There is a small and a large side. The complexity is clearly dominated by the large side, corresponding to f 2 . We sieve over elements a + bα, map them into the number field and compute their norm b
As usual, the smoothness probability over a smoothness basis of ideals of prime norm up to L Q (
). To ensure that we get enough relations, we need:
which has the positive root:
This is minimized for δ = 
B.2 Descent Initialization: The Descent's Dominating Step
In the initial descent step, we first need to go from norms of size L Q (1) down to factors of size L Q ( 2 3 ). Indeed, by opposition to the ffs setting, here smoothness testing can only be done using ecm factorization. Consequently, this step costs L factor ( ) and we cannot afford more than that. We use the same strategy as described in [11] and simply randomize the input challenge until it becomes smooth as an integer. As the complexity of pulling-out a factor F with ecm costs L F ( 
Smoothness probability is
3 ). Thus, the total workfactor per smooth value is L Q ( 
B.3 Continuing The Descent
In the middle of the descent, we consider a special-q of size L Q (λ, µ) with
. We sieve over polynomials of degree:
and with coefficients of size S = L Q ((λ+ 
Thus the total norm after dividing by the special-q, which can be ignored is,
Minimizing this under the constraint st = µ yields t = δ µ 2 . This step is clearly not the dominating task in the descent. In fact, we can adapt the descent's speed to the specific problem at hand. The only restriction is that the descent should be fast enough to only get a relatively small number of values at the final step of the descent.
B.4 Concluding The Descent
In the final descent step, we need to express special-q values of size immediately above L Q ( 
This is constrained by the fact that we need enough sieving space, i.e. by the relation:
which yields 1.27 as in [11] , which does not dominate the overall asymptotic complexity of the descent step.
C Complexity Analysis -High Degree nfs
Here, we work in
. The polynomial construction is as follows. First, choose a parameter 0 < α < 1 2 , which value will be determined later, on and an integer A close to p α . Using Euclidean division write p = BA + r p with B p 1−α and 0 ≤ r p < A.
Then, find an irreducible polynomial f 1 of degree n, which coefficients are either small numbers or a small multiples of A. All coefficients of f 1 have a size bounded by p α . Finally, let f 2 = Bf 1 mod p, all coefficients of f 2 are either small multiples of B or small multiples of r p . Hence, their size is at most of order p 1−α .
C.1 Sieving And Linear Algebra
Again, complexity is bounded by the large side, given by f 2 . We sieve over polynomials of degree D defined by: i.e. 3β 2 = 2µ.
In addition, to ensure that we get enough relations, we need:
i.e. 2β = (1 − α)µ 2 .
Put together, this yields β = 3 8
9 (1 − α) . And, the complexity of the sieving step is L Q ( 1 − α) ).
C.2 Descent Initialization
In the initial descent step, as in the regular nfs case, we first need to go from norms of size L Q (1) down to factors of size L Q ( 2 3 ). However, since f 1 's coefficients are of order p α , the norm of a generic element, with degree n and coefficient modulo p is larger than Q. This norm is in fact, of order L Q (1, 1 + α).
Using the ecm to go to factors of size L Q ( For this α the complexities of the sieving and of the descent's initialization become:
C.3 Continuing the descent
In the middle of the descent, we encounter a special-q of size L Q (λ , µ ) with 1 3 < λ < 2 3 . We sieve over polynomials of degree: T = t log Q log log Q λ t and with coefficients of size S = L Q (λ s , s). The two values λ s and λ t are related and sum to λ . More precisely, we choose:
The sieving space size is L Q (λ , st − µ ). Since L Q ( 1 3 ) freedom should suffice, we can make st tends to µ from upward. Again, there is enough freedom here and this step is not limiting.
